Why invoices are attractive attack targets.
Invoice traffic is routine, time-sensitive and often involves attachments or payment links. Attackers imitate suppliers, delivery patterns and internal approval language to blend into normal work.
Never change bank details from email alone.
Verify changed payment details through a known, independent contact channel. Do not use the phone number included in the suspicious message. Record the check as part of the payment process.
Technical signals help but do not replace controls.
Mail authentication, filtering and attachment scanning reduce risk. A compromised supplier account can still send technically legitimate messages, so payment verification remains necessary.
Training should reflect real workflows.
Exercises are most useful when they use realistic invoice, purchase-order and approval scenarios. A managed security awareness programme should explain both warning signs and the correct reporting route.
CEO fraud exploits hierarchy.
Urgent confidential instructions from senior management pressure employees to bypass established checks. Leadership should make clear that verification is expected, even for executive requests.
Real communication data increases credibility.
Attackers may use names, projects and supplier relationships found online or in compromised mailboxes. Familiar context is therefore not proof that a message is genuine.
Do not forward suspicious mail like ordinary mail.
Use the defined reporting function or attach the original message so that headers and technical evidence remain available. Simple forwarding can remove useful information.
Check other recipients quickly after a hit.
If one person receives a convincing attack, search for similar messages, warn likely targets and review whether credentials or payments were affected. Fast coordination limits follow-on damage.